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CHAPTER 7 
 
AT THE CUTTING EDGE: PRECARIOUS WORK ,1%5$=,/·668*$5$1'
ETHANOL INDUSTRY 
 
Brian Garvey and Maria Joseli Barreto 
 
Dawnlight seeps slowly into São Paulo skies 
as if reluctant to rediscover old betrayals 
or disclose new ones  
 
Dennis Brutus, 2010 
 
INTRODUCTION  
     The late geographer Milton Santos interpreted the changing Brazilian landscape as a dynamic 
social product of work, both past and present.  What happened at each specific site was affected 
by previous practices and by their link to the globalized systems into which these sites were 
LQFRUSRUDWHG´6SDFHµKHZURWH (1978, p. 138),  
is a witness to a moment in the mode of production in these concrete manifestations; it is 
where some processes adapt themselves to pre-existing forms, while others create new 
forms that are inserted. 
His words resonate across the swaying stands of sugarcane, blood red soils and cloudless skies 
surrounding the biofuel refinery in %UD]LO·VSão Paulo State where we base our study of 
precarious work in the production of sugar-derived ethanol.  They begin to explain how it is that 
company engineers are flown to Canada to perfect advanced biotechnologies as sugarcane 
cutters disembark from a dusty bus and angle their machetes into the fields for their last season 
of employment.  They help us understand why new public/private highways linking once-remote 
rural areas to expanding port terminals will be driven by those willing to risk their life to make a 
living wage.  And they help us comprehend how a cane cutter, who stands amidst the fields of 
%UD]LO·VROGHVWLQGXVWU\now targeted for North American, European and Asian investment and 
reflects that ¶WKH\GRQ·WZDQWWRNQRZ if you live or if you die·, symbolises not just a 
superexploitation of rural workers inherited from slave plantations and their historic invisibility 
to state policy but also their dispensability in the contemporary project of modernization rolled 
out by government and the recent mergers between Brazilian and international capital. 
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     In this context, this chapter explores what Brazilian state and corporate determination to lead 
the international commodification of green energy in general ² and sugar-derived ethanol in 
particular ² mean for the growth of precarious work amongst those who cut and transport 
sugarcane in two areas of São Paulo State, a region with a relatively long history of industrial 
production and westward expansion into the interior.  Three categories of workers are being 
subjected to this precarity.  First, there are the locally sourced, waged cane cutters who are still 
paid based upon the weight of cane they cut and who face a crude, Darwinesque ¶VHOHFWLRQRIWKH
ILWWHVW·DWWKHHQGRIHDFKVHDVRQas they anxiously await the announcement of those who will be 
invited back the following year.1  Second, there are the migrant cane cutters, who exist in a 
permanent condition of underemployment and who are contracted temporarily to the cane 
fields.  For both of these groups the pressure to compensate for a very poor and seasonal wage 
by augmenting production through the forfeiting of breaks and the illegal lengthening of the 
working day ² practices which have contributed to the alarming growth in worker deaths in the 
cane fields ² is exacerbated by the annual cull of the workforce.  Third, there are the drivers of 
the sugarcane trucks, workers who, in the context of the current trend towards the outsourcing 
of transport work for ¶greater operational efficiencies·, are subject not only to third-party 
subcontracting but, frequently, fourth-party subcontracting and who, because of their tenuous 
contracts, are stuck without statutory or trade union protections and so are routinely pushed to 
drive for ever longer periods of time, a development which has made the road transport of cargo 
%UD]LO·VPost dangerous profession.  
     These, then, are the categories of workers we analyse as we explore the persistence of 
precarity within %UD]LO·Vsugar-producing sector over four distinct periods: i) the post-
revolutionary era of state planning (1930-64); ii) the period of import substitution under military 
rule; iii) the phase of neoliberal structural adjustment policies implemented between 1982 and 
2002 under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and iv) the era of the 
expansion of international capital in the sector following the Kyoto Protocol of 2002.  After 
outlining these four periods in general terms, we then explore how they impacted the two 
regions of our study ² Middle Paranapanema and Pontal of Paranapanema (see Figure 5.1).  In 
so doing we pay particular attention to the hegemonic companies present in the region which 
have driven WKHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRI%UD]LO·VELRIXHOLQGXVWU\DQGwhich have transformed the 
landscape ² economically and materially ² through their aggressive competitive strategies.  In the 
FKDSWHU·Vthird section we draw upon the testimonies of salaried and contracted manual 
sugarcane cutters, together with those of the truck drivers who transport sugarcane in the 
outsourced sections of the commodity chain, to examine the implications of these industrial 
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developments for the growth of insecure, underpaid, seasonal, poorly protected and hazardous 
work.  Finally, we explore how these precarious conditions are variably accepted or resisted 
individually and collectively.  In doing so we consider the current and future challenges faced by 
%UD]LO·VWUDGHXQLRQV  
 
INSERT FIGURE 7.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
THE STATE, SUGAR AND SERVITUDE 
     %UD]LO·VILUVWUHILQHU\to process the sugarcane cut by slaves on huge northeastern plantations 
(latifundia) was built in 1532.  The wealth generated by this white gold would be instrumental in 
shifting the locus of mercantilism away from the Mediterranean towards transAtlantic commerce 
and, later, in driving European industrialization.  Although the 18th century saw growing 
challenges from French and British planters in Haiti, Barbados and Jamaica, sugar has remained 
RQHRI%UD]LO·VPRVWLPSRUWDQWFDVKFURSV for nearly five hundred years.  Initially reliant upon 
labour provided by slaves from Guinea, Congo and the Portuguese possessions of Angola and 
Mozambique, little changed in how the industry was organized after slavery·VDEROLWLRQ in 1888.  
Given that Brazilian elites·SURILWV have historically been tied to the sale and consumption of their 
products abroad, both during and after slavery they have shown little interest in how their 
workers have been able to socially reproduce themselves domestically.  Instead, their primary 
concern has largely been to ensure the continued availability of an abundant reserve of cheap, 
interchangeable labour (Souza 1975; Santos 1978; Marini 2005).  In the absence of the kinds of 
technical developments which increased the productivity of labour in the European industrial 
revolution, securing greater levels of surplus value from sugarcane workers has historically been 
done largely by increasing their work rate whilst reducing their wages.  Consequently, physical 
degradation and the need for workers to supplement their meagre incomes through subsistence 
agriculture or through finding secondary jobs have been the enduring hallmarks of a super-
exploitation of readily available labour that has EHHQLQWHJUDOWR%UD]LO·VFDSLWDOLVWGHYHORSPHQW 
(Marini 2005).  What is most striking about this development model, though, is the persistence 
of this kind of work alongside recent technological and economic developments which have seen 
Brazil HPHUJHDVRQHRIWKHSODQHW·VODUJHVWDQGPRVWG\QDPLFHFRQRPLHV.  To understand how 
this has come to be, in the remainder of this section we outline the complex articulations of 
VWDWHFDSLWDODQGODERXUUHODWLRQVWKURXJKIRXUGLVWLQFWHFRQRPLFSHULRGVLQ%UD]LO·Vrecent 
history.  
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From colonialism to state planning 
     %UD]LO·VORVVRISULPDF\ in the sugar trade following the abolition of slavery and growing 
competition from the Caribbean, Antilles and Philippines was exacerbated by the 1929 economic 
crisis, which reduced demand for Brazilian sugar in European and US markets (Edel 1969).  
Amidst economic upheaval and discord among the landowning elites, discontented politicians 
and soldiers marched into Rio de Janeiro in 1930 and declared a new Republic.  The new state 
actors, without historic ties to the powerful northeastern landowners, quickly recognized that 
ethanol, long considered a mere by-product of sugar, had the potential to substitute for imported 
oil (Szmrecsányi 1979).  With the establishment of the Institute of Sugar and Alcohol (Instituto 
do Açucar e do Alcool ² IAA) in 1933, they took an increasingly central role in the planning and 
development of the sugarcane industry.   
     Over the next 40 years the area of sugar cultivation increased more than five-fold and 
production by a factor of six as companies in the Central and Southeastern ¶&HQWUR-6XG·region 
of Brazil took advantage of generous government subsidies toward those refineries that could 
switch between sugar and ethanol production.  They found a healthy market in the increasing 
sugar and energy demands brought about by rapid industrialization in the state of São Paulo, 
such that by the 1950s the Central South region had replaced the Northeast DVWKHFRXQWU\·V
major sugar supplier (Ribeiro and Tonella 2010).  Having concentrated almost solely on sugar 
production, the Northeast, once the richest region in Brazil, quickly became the poorest, 
bleeding an army of rural labourers who migrated seasonally or permanently to São Paulo SWDWH·V 
expanding cane fields.    
 
Import substitution in the 1970s 
     Despite the efforts of the IAA to boost indigenous ethanol demand and supply, 80 per cent 
RIWKHHQHUJ\UHTXLUHGWRGULYHWKHPLOLWDU\JRYHUQPHQW·Vimport-substitution policies of the 
1960s and early 70s was met by imported oil.  This dependency was starkly revealed when the 
cost of oil imports tripled during the 1973 OPEC crisis.  Facing economic crisis, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade launched the PROALCOOL programme in 1975 to achieve two principal 
goals: i) increase the national production and consumption of ethanol as a biofuel replacement of 
oil; and ii) grow the chemical processing industry to counter the national balance of payments 
deficit (Ribeiro and Tonella 2010).  
     The PROALCOOL programme was one of several agro-industrial policies during this time 
which relied heavily upon borrowed money, much of it sourced from abroad.  However, the 
PLOLWDU\·Vvicious repression of organizations representing labour, which saw its share of national 
181 
 
income slashed, appeared to be counterproductive as it resulted in the population simply not 
having sufficient purchasing power to spur on national development (Marini 2005).2  This 
problem was exacerbated in 1982, when Brazil underwent the largest (at that time) debt default 
in modern history and the government was forced to the table by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  The resultant structural adjustment programme deregulated the state-planned 
sector and ended the export regulations that had favoured northeastern landowners at the 
expense of the southern (São Paulo) distilleries (Leal 2008).  It also ended controls on land 
pricing and led to a virtual end to credit support for the rural poor, who were no longer able to 
reproduce their familial agriculture.  Overall, some three million jobs were lost in the countryside 
(Jakobsen and Barbosa 2008).  This led, in turn, to increased migration to the urban centres, 
swelling the favelas and city peripheries as inequality reached a historic peak (Cassel and Patel 
2003). 
 
Market liberalization 
     Brazil deepened its integration into regional and global markets by joining the southern 
trading bloc MERCOSUR in 1991 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  The 
withdrawal of targeted subsidies and subsequent intensification of competition closed the doors 
of many sugarcane mills in the north of Brazil, contributing to the exodus of about 1.5 million 
migrants between 1995 and 2000 from Pernambuco alone (Hirsch et al. 2002; Santos 2006).  
Many of these migrants found their way to São Paulo·V cane fields and were amongst the 25 
million rural workers surviving on temporary rural jobs as foreign debt servicing replaced 
national welfare spending, work informality peaked and wealth was further concentrated.3  
Unemployment more than doubled between 1994 and 2000 (from 6.1 per cent to 15 per cent) 
and, ironically, was higher amongst the better educated (with 4 to 7 years of schooling) than 
amongst those with less than one year of schooling.  This ZDVDVWDUNLQGLFDWLRQRI%UD]LO·V
reversion to primary production for export under IMF-inspired neoliberalism and, as agricultural 
exports increased to 41 per cent of total exports, a renewed reliance upon a particular and 
historic comparative advantage: poorly paid and unskilled labour. 
     Despite these developments, the government dispatched R$2.2 billion in public funds to 
reenergize distillery development as low ethanol demand and unstable sugar prices escalated 
debts within the industry at the close of the century.4  Seventy per cent of this credit was used by 
São Paulo State companies, whose economies of scale allowed them to buffer the crisis that had 
disabled weaker firms and so to pave the way for a migration of the more successful companies 
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ZLWKQHZRUJDQL]DWLRQDOVWUDWHJLHVDQGFRPSHWHQFLHVWRWKH¶UHJLRQDOIURQWLHUVRIVXJDUFDQH·
(Belik 1998, p. 159; Eid and Neve 1998; see also Santos 1996).   
 
Renewable energy and international expansion  
     In the context of these changes, São Paulo State-based companies were well positioned to 
take advantage of the lifeline thrown to the industry by the 2002 ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which increased global interest in renewable energy production.  Furthermore, the 
newly elected government of President Lula da Silva boosted the market though the 2003 
introduction of incentives for ¶IOH[LEOHIXHOYHKLFOHV·))9Vwhich can run on either petroleum 
or ethanol-based fuel.  Presently, 88 per cent of new light duty vehicles produced in Brazil are 
FFVs and, to date, these vehicles and endogenous industry have absorbed almost all of Brazil·V
annual ethanol production.  With global biofuel prices doubling between 2000 and 2010, leading 
global brands in food (Bunge, Cargill), energy (BP, Shell), biotechnology (Monsanto, Iogen) and 
DXWRPRELOHV+\XQGDL0LWVXELVKLPRYHGLQWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRI%UD]LO·VQDWXUDOHQGRZPHQWV
of land, sun and water, its large internal market, attractive interest rates and a remarkable R$28.2 
billion in state credit.5   
     As a result of these developments, the area planted with sugarcane almost doubled between 
2000 and 2011 (from 4.8 to 8.1 million hectares) and ethanol production increased from 11 
billion to 28 billion litres over the same period.  The companies most responsible for the second 
boom in ethanol production (between 2004 and 2009) have been those with access to sufficient 
international finance to redistribute escalating debts and nourish the required territorial and 
technological advances.  This has been even more apparent following the 2008 financial crisis 
(Mendonça et al. 2013).  With the subsequent squeeze on government-backed credit, 
multinational companies have grown at the expense of those with more limited scales of 
operation.  Thus, fifty-one companies have ceased operations since 2007, with 30 of these 
folding in 2011 and 2012 alone.  By 2012 these closures had extinguished an estimated 13 000 
direct and 32 000 indirect jobs (Folha de S. Paulo 2012).   
     The period of the early 2000s, then, was one of significant capital centralization and 
concentration.  Ninety-nine mergers and acquisitions took place in the ethanol industry between 
2000 and 2009 (Pretto 2009; Scaramuzzo 2009).  By 2011, the amount of foreign capital in the 
sector had tripled in just the previous three years and four of the top five companies are now 
more than 50 per cent owned by foreign interests (Borras et al. 2012).  Of the 43 member 
companies of the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (União da Indústria de Cana-de-
Açúcar ² UNICA) that produced 60 per cent RIWKHFRXQWU\·VHWKDQROin 2012, just two (Cosan 
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DQG&RSHUVXFDUFRPPDQGHGSHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\·VSURGXFWLRQ.  These operational scales 
of the industrial leaders make for highly unequal power relations.  
 
GLOBAL FORCES IMPACTING LOCAL PRODUCTION 
Middle Paranapanema 
     In 1936 and 1947, respectively, two family-owned distilleries ² Cosan and NovAmérica ² 
were founded in São Paulo State.  In the 1980s Cosan formed joint ventures with several French, 
British and US sugar conglomerates, thereby expanding its production and market capacity.  In 
2009 the company took over several NovAmérica distilleries.  However, it chose not to acquire 
NovAmérica·V agricultural operations, which today supply 8.5 million tonnes of sugarcane to 
Cosan plants in Tarumá, Maracaí, Paraguaçu and Caarapó, thus pushing responsibility for the 
supply of a high quality and quantity of sugar onto its contracted providers.  It thus avoided 
direct responsibility for the labour involved in planting, harvesting and transporting raw 
sugarcane, although this does not mean that it is not deeply implicated in the unlawful, degrading 
and slave-like working conditions experienced by cane cutters in recent years (Reporter Brasil 
2011a; Xavier et al. 2011).  In 2010 Cosan merged with oil giant Royal Dutch Shell to form a new 
company: Raízen.  Valued at US$20 billion, the venture quickly gained a 23 per cent share in the 
national sugar market and Raízen became the largest sugar and ethanol producer in the world, 
promising to double ethanol production and ¶turn ethanol in to an international commodity· 
(Raízen 2012).   
     The centralization and concentration of sugar capital exemplified by the emergence of Raízen 
is having significant impacts.  In particular, the intensified competition imposed by the large 
corporations has exacerbated problems for the few family-owned plants left in the Middle 
Paranapanema region of São Paulo State.  One such plant is the 3DXG·$OKRfacility in Ibirarema, 
whose closure in December 2012 had dramatic effects on the small town ² of WKHPXQLFLSDOLW\·V
7200 inhabitants, 1800 workers lost their jobs.  With the company owing US$26 million in wages 
to workers, local newspapers carried stories of businesses suffering a 40 per cent decrease in 
sales and 80 families were reported to have left town.  When the laid-off workers were not 
provided their outstanding wages, social security and holiday entitlements, some 400 of them 
blocked local roads in protest in June 2013.  The crisis led the WRZQ·VPD\RUto declare a state of 
emergency (Globo G1 2013).  Even so, as bad as is the situation in Middle Paranapanema, stories 
that point to the creative destructive processes spawned by the leading sugar-processing 
companies have been far more numerous in the spaces of westward expansion ² that is to say, 
the Pontal of Paranapanema.  
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Pontal of Paranapanema 
     In planting the first sugarcane seedling in the humble town of Teodoro Sampaio on the 
western limit of São Paulo State in 1974, the Minister of Trade and Energy symbolically opened 
this new frontier for sugar and biofuel production on the eve of the PROALCOOL 
SURJUDPPH·VXQYHLOLQJ/RFDOODQGRZQLQJHOLWHVFRQYHUWHGWKHLUSDVWXUHVWRVXJDUFDQHEXLOGLQJ
six distilleries between 1974 and 1982.  Lacking the experience and industrial networks enjoyed 
by established firms such as Cosan and NovAmérica, however, when the direct state support 
from PROALCOOL ended these distilleries increasingly encountered financial difficulties and by 
2004 only two were still in business (Barreto 2012).  Between 2000 and 2010, though, when a 
second wave of industrial expansion took place in Western Paranapanema, sugarcane production 
increased from 75 million to some 330 million hectares.  Four of the five firms that took 
advantage of the flat, affordable land, low labour costs and municipal elites keen to attract 
private investment during this period were corporations boasting foreign investment, as opposed 
to the kinds of local enterprises that had first appeared in the 1970s. 
     In understanding the history of sugar production in the Pontal of Paranapanema, the story of 
the Alvorada do Oeste distillery is perhaps instructive.  Founded in 1979, the business had 23 
shareholders, all large landowners from the Santo Anastacio municipality.  However, poor 
management and the end of government subsidies contributed to bankruptcy and the laying off 
of hundreds of workers in the late 1980s.  After a short-lived, unsuccessful return to production 
in the 1990s, the company was bought by the Marques Group of Minas Gerais State in 2005 and 
remained at productive capacity until the 2008/2009 season.  When the large firms entered the 
region, however, land rents rose dramatically.  This made it difficult for smaller entities like 
Alvorada do Oeste to meet its rental payment for the 7000 hectares it required to supply 
adequate amounts of raw sugarcane whilst maintaining the technical investments needed to stay 
competitive.  Consequently, in 2011/2012, when production fell to below half of capacity and 
with borrowing abilities limited after the credit crisis of 2008, the company was forced to turn to 
municipal authorities for financial support, in the form of a Judicial Recuperation Plan.  This, 
though, was insufficient to save it and by the end of 2013 the plant had ceased activity, as had 
three other local companies, resulting in thousands of workers being laid off.  When the dust 
settled Odebrecht Agroindustrial (the product of a merger between Japanese firm Sojitz and 
Brazilian multinational Odebrecht), a company that was seeking to control 100 000 hectares in 
the Pontal alone, moved in and took over the Alvorada do Oeste distillery and its associated land 
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and also secured control of the supply of raw sugar from the nearby Decasa plant that had 
folded in October 2013.   
     Across the UHJLRQ·Vsmall towns events like these have led to a palpable frustration on the part 
of laid-off workers.  Workers have arrived to find factory gates closed, have received fake 
cheques, and have waited for wages, social entitlements and sick pay for many months.  Given 
that the monthly wage paid to the unskilled and semi-skilled workers only just covers basic living 
expenses ² leading multinationals continue to give monthly food packages to their poorest-paid 
staff ² and given that the industry monopolizes localized employment opportunities, the 
prospect of destitution is very real.  It is this situation that forms the backdrop to the individual 
stories of precarious work to which we now turn.  
 
THE EXPERIENCE OF PRECARIOUS WORK IN THE CANE FIELDS 
Full-time cane cutters in Middle Paranapanema 
     Lucas, now 65, lists the several sugar plantations furnishing NovAmérica and then Cosan in 
Tarumá, Paraguaçu and Maracaí that he has trodden since the age of 15, when he was paid in his 
IDWKHU·VQDPHDQGZDVKLGGHQLQIXUURZVDORQJZLWKRWKHUFKLOGUHQZKHQWKHDXthorities visited 
WKHPLOO¶0\JRRGQHVV·KHVD\VDVKLVH\HV² glassy from 25 years of no protection from the 
glaring sun ² ORRNGRZQDQGWKHQRIILQWRWKHGLVWDQFH¶LWZDVEUXWDOZRUN·+HFRXOGQRWFRXQW
the number of times he had collapsed in the fields but continued because his employer would 
RWKHUZLVHGRFNVLFNSD\IURPKLVZDJHV+HIHOWIRUWXQDWHWRKDYHUHDFKHGUHWLUHPHQW¶RWKHUZLVH
,ZRXOGKDYHEHHQUHWLUHGRQLOOKHDOWK· 
     Many other workers we interviewed, who are now living in poor, peripheral housing in Assis 
and Maracaí, recalled working in coffee, cotton and maize fields in the 1970s and 1980s when 
subsistence agriculture was the mainstay of thousands in the region and sugarcane cutting was 
one of several seasonal jobs.  However, with the expansion of mono-cropping, and of sugarcane 
in particular, these opportunities disappeared.  As local agricultural workers lost control over 
their traditional means of production and because the small, rural towns favoured by sugar 
plantations provided few other employment opportunities, the notoriously poorly paid, harsh 
work on the plantation was (and still is) one of the few opportunities for the rural workers who 
were proletarianized during these decades.  
     With this scenario being repeated throughout %UD]LO·Vsugar-growing regions, the expanding 
monoculture had attracted (and actively sought) migrant workers from Paraná State (the greatest 
exporter of people in the 1970s), Minas Gerias and the more distant, northeastern regions of 
Alagoas DQG%DKLD7KHLQVHUWLRQRIWKHVHVHDVRQDOZRUNHUVIURP%UD]LO·VSRRUHVWUHJLRQVLQWR
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the sugarcane industry certainly boosted production (Moraes 2000; Thomaz Júnior 2003).  
However, this boost was based upon a high degree of exploitation, for the men and women who 
toiled in the fields were paid notoriously low wages.  Luis, for instance, recalled 100 buses 
bringing workers to the NovAmérica SODQWDWLRQV7KHVHEXVHVZHUHFRPPDQGHGE\WKH¶JDWRV·
¶FDWV·WKLUG-party contractors engaged by the sugar companies to find, recruit, transport and 
accommodate cane cutters who URXWLQHO\PDGHGHGXFWLRQVIURPWKHZRUNHUV·ZDJHVIRUWKHVH, 
often substandard, services.  These agents targeted the thousands of workers and small farmers 
who had been driven from the fielGVE\%UD]LO·V20th-century modernization strategies and 
clustered in the outskirts of urban areas (Silva 1999).  Lacking education and access to secure 
employment in the cities, these workers, neither fully urban nor any longer solely rural, were 
pulled back to work on daily or seasonal trips to the sugar plantations by these intermediaries 
who blurred the relations between employer and employee.  By the 1990s, 390 000 manual 
workers were being brought to the cane fields of São Paulo.  Lucas reeled off several rural towns 
of Paraná State that had supplied most of the seasonal workers to the NovAmérica plantation 
and its largest suppliers.  7KHVH¶FDWV·HDFKFRPPDQGHGWKUHHRUPRUHEXVHV, with around 48 cane 
cutters on each, and their own payment was often based upon the productivity of the workers 
they supplied.  Junior, whom we met with two work colleagues after an early finish one Saturday 
afternoon, was one of them.  He explained: 
I heard Tarumã was a paradise [and] that you could earn more.«$WILUVW,FDme for 
several seasons, by bus every day, getting home at 1am in the morning.  Back in Paraná I 
worked on a farm with cattle and maize and got R$900 per month but here, if you work 
hard, you can earn twice the minimum wage.  So we came here because of the children.  
,·YHZRUNHGIRU\HDUVDVDFDQHFXWWHUEXWWRWHOO\RXWKHWUXWKDIWHUUHQWIRRGDQG
water«WKHUH·VQRWKLQJOHIWDWWKHHQGRIWKHPRQWK 
     /XFDV·VHTXDWLQJRIKDUGZRUNZLWKDQDXJPHQWDWLRQRILQFRPHUHIHUVWRWKHpiece-rate 
system, condemned by Adam Smith and Karl Marx, amongst others, that is maintained to this 
day by the plantation owners.  The system incentivizes the worker to push harder, to cut breaks 
and to work longer in the hope of making gains that s/he is never quite certain of receiving.  
Whilst a series of now-legendary strikes by more than 5000 cane cutters in Guariba, São Paulo 
State in the mid-1980s gained year-round salaries for locally sourced cutters and substituted 
payment by weight with payment per metre cut VHH'·,ncao and Botelho 1987; Xavier and 
Barone 2008), such that workers can at least roughly gauge the number of metres they have 
worked, the rudimentary conversions from metre to tonnage and then to wages are still made by 
the employer out of sight of the workers.  These measurements are prone to discrepancies 
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and/or deliberate undercounting by employers and have routinely been used as a method by 
which excess surplus value has been extracted from the cutters.  Furthermore, despite gaining 
year-round salaries, rural workers have overall seen a drop in real wages following the application 
of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 90s, with the price they are paid per ton cut (adjusted for 
inflation) having diminished from R$2.73 (US$1.16) in 1970 to about R$0.80 in the mid-2000s 
(Ramos 2007).  Although the average basic wage cutters received increased in line with national 
minimum wage improvements after 2003, their real wages fell again following the 2008 financial 
crisis (Repórter Brasil 2008).  This means that the workers must continually increase output to 
make-up for a basic real ZDJHWKDWLVLQVXIILFLHQWIRUDIDPLO\·VVXUYLYDO.6 
     Pedro, a worker on one of the large plantations contracted to supply the Maracaí distillery that 
Cosan acquired from NovAmérica, gave us an insight into the implications for their bodies of 
cutters continuously pushing themselves: 
7KH\VD\,·PWKHIDVWHVWILUVWRUVHFRQG.  AQ\ZD\WKH\VD\WKDW,GRQ·WNQRZ%XWRQH
PRUQLQJEDFNLQ,ZDVIHHOLQJVWURQJ,VDLG¶KH\OHDYHHYHU\WKLQJWRPH· I was 
¶pah! pah! pah!· [he swings his arm, as if cutting cane].  I got to lunch time, the food 
ZRXOGQ·WJRGRZQJRWVWXFNKHUH>SRLQWLQJWRKLVWKURDW@VR,ZHQWEDFNWRZRUN7KHQ
LWZDVDOPRVWWLPHWRJRKRPH,FRXOGQ·WVHHDQ\WKing anymore.  Next thing I knew, 
where did I wake up?  In hospital, with a drip in my arm....[T]he doctor told me to rest, 
gave me 15 days.1RRQHFDPHWRVHHPH7KH\GRQ·WZDQWWRNQRZLI\RXOLYHRULI\RX
die.  No one cares for the rural worker.  And when I got back to work they just looked at 
PHOLNH¶DZKH·VQRJRRGDQ\PRUH· 
His colleague, originally from Alagoas, who also had replaced seasonal with annual work by 
eventually relocating to Tarumã, nodded in knowing agreement.  As he commented: 
TKHFUDPSV\RXNQRZWKH\·UHFRPPRQDQGWKH\FDQNLOO7KH\UHDOO\NLOO3HRSOH
VZDOORZWKHLUWRQJXHVXIIHUFRQYXOVLRQV%XWZKHQWKHZRUNHUGLHVWKH\GRQ·WSXEOLVKLW.  
They say it was some health reason. 
     Although several spontaneous strikes during the 1980s served to bring attention to systemic 
breaches of working-time regulations and pay, of health and safety measures, and to the failure 
to provide protective equipment, fresh water, shelter and accommodation, the response from the 
industry has been largely encapsulated in this candid statement from a logistics consultant, whose 
clients control 60 per cent of Brazil sugar and ethanol production: 
Now you have these laws, like breaks for sugarcane cutters.  They have to stop for two 
hours if the temperature gets too high.  An hour for lunch.  You have to provide water, 
188 
 
shade.  Costs go up, productivity goes down.  One machine can do the work of one 
hundred men. 
In light of such an admission, it is perhaps not surprising that  cane cutters viewed 
mechanisation as an (ultimately successful) attempt to break the organizational capacity of their 
trade unions.  The impact of the introduction of such machinery can be measured by the 
dramatic reduction in labour needs ² whereas in 2003 2300 cane cutters travelled to 
NovAmérica·VILHOGVIURP$VVLVFLW\DORQHLQRQO\PDGHWKHGDLO\MRXUQH\+RZHYHU
not only has the mechanization of field work reduced the number of cutters required but it has 
also intensified the labour of those who remain, lest low productivity be used as an excuse to 
replace them with technology and/or to cull them from the returning groups of migrant workers.  
Thus, according to at least one local trade unionist, Diogo, the new arrangement 
gives workers the sense that they must work harder to get chosen for the next 
VHDVRQ«>1RZ@WKHRZQHUVFDQFKRRVHWKHEHVWHDFK\HDUWKHVWURQJHVWVR, for sure, the 
workload has increased. 
     7KHHPSOR\HUV·XVHRIDQDQQXDOVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVH[SODLQVERWKWKHGHFUHDVLQJDYHUDJHDJHRI
workers and the intensification of the workload for the young males who are preferred.  
Moreover, this practice has had profound gender consequences.  Beginning in the late 1980s, the 
women whom ZHLQWHUYLHZHGDQGZKRUHFDOOHG¶ZRUNLQJDVKDUGDVWKHPHQWRJHWNHSWRQ·
(Paula, aged 58) and who had struck for equal pay had started being moved from cutting to 
planting.  They were then further demoted to collecting cane that had fallen from trucks and 
then were finally almost completely phased out in São Paulo State.  This spectre of 
unemployment that had initially affected the women, however, now also weighs heavily upon the 
remaining men in the region.  Hence, as Pedro, a man in his fifties who is from Paraná but who 
settled in Tarumã, states: 
WH·YHKHDUGWKDWZH·re going to be out of work [by 2017].  We hHDUGWKHUH·OOEHQRPRUH
Last year there were 14 teams working in the plantation.  This year just«ours and one 
other. 
When asked if he would be selected for the following year, he and two colleagues shrugged.  
I GRQ·WNQRZ,WGHSHQGVRQWKHPLOO'HSHQGVRQWKHRZQHU, GRHVQ·WLW"%XW,
KRSHVR,I,·PQRWDFDQHFXWWHUZKDWZLOO,EH"7KH\VD\WKHUH·VZRUNLQWKH
distilleries, but you need a minimum qualification and a driving license.  I was at 
school but my father needed us to work on the farm, so my older brother and I 
TXLWVFKRROWRKHOSKLP,I\RXGRQ·WKDYHWKHVHSDSHUVIRUJHWLW«7KH\WHOOXVWKDW
there are courses for us [training courses for the semi-skilled jobs] and that, in a few 
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years, the cane cutting will finish.  But it costs R$2-IRUDFRXUVH:HGRQ·W
KDYHWKLVPRQH\0D\EHZH·OOJHWZRUNIRUWKHFRXQFLOVZHHSLQJWKHVWUHHWVEXWZH
FDQ·WHYHQGRWKLVEHFDXVH\RXVWLOOQHHGWRSDVVDSXEOLFH[DPIRUWKDW«0D\EHLI
the council outsources the work, you might get a job with a company but it would 
only be temporary....This is why we need to be cane cutters.  
     Between 2009 and 2014, 180 000 cane cutters lost their jobs.  Whilst the modern factories 
announce convincingly that they offer training and new positions to those facing unemployment 
(ILO and UNEP 2012), this is little comfort to those workers in their 50s who form a 
demographic of older and poorly educated citizens whose lack of formal schooling excludes 
them from these opportunities ² most RI%UD]LO·VVXJDUFDQHFXWWHUVGLGQRWILQLVKHOHPHQWDU\
school (currently nine years), 70 per cent have up to only four years of study and almost one-
third are illiterate (Moraes 2007).  Thus, although 40 000 sugarcane cutters in São Paulo State 
were made redundant between 2007 and 2011, the industry had provided new opportunities for 
only 10 per cent of these (Baccarin and Borges Jr. 2011).  Although many had commenced 
courses, most were unable to complete them.  Whilst there is some work in the construction 
sites, this is often short-WHUPDQG¶GU\LQJXS·6RPHFROOHDJXHVZKRKDGEHHQGLVPLVVHGIURPWKH
cane fields were taken on for six months at a time but then let go.  As Luis (64) later told us, he 
KDGWDNHQKLV&9HYHU\ZKHUHEXW¶QRERG\ZDQWVDQROGZRUNHU· 
     Now that sugar monoculture dominates agricultural activity in the region, the meagre 
options for the remaining workers elsewhere underscore the incentive to retain their waged 
job, even for another year or two.  Yet this compounds the already-existing pressure to 
earn a living wage by enhancing production.  Such compounding is reflected in an 
incredible intensification of manual harvesting across the sector that has seen the average 
daily workload rise from three tonnes per day in 1980 to between five and eight tonnes in 
1990 and to 10 to 12 tonnes in 2006 (Alves 2006).  In addition, it is now a widely 
understood, if unspoken, rule that for a cane cutter to maintain employment he must cut at 
OHDVWWRQQHVSHUGD\7RGD\·VFXWWHrs harvest a volume of sugarcane in 12 years that 
VODYHVPDQDJHGLQ\HDUVDQGWKHLU¶XVHIXO·ZRUNLQJOLIHKDVEHHQUHGXFHGWRWR
years, whereas it was as much as 20 on the 19th-century plantations (Silva and Ribeiro 
2010).  Presently, a brutal tally of 16 tonnes per day is not uncommon.  This pressure on 
production is exacerbated for the seasonal workers who still augment the workforce.  
When a 27-year old working on one of the large plantations supplying sugarcane to 
Raízen·V Maracaí plant stated FDVXDOO\WKDW¶WKHZRUNHUVIURP0LQDV>*HUDLV@WKH\·UH\RXQJ
in their twenties like me.  Many come for the season and, if they are good enough, they are 
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NHSWRQ·, then the performance-EDVHGWHQXRXVQDWXUHRIWKHVHPLJUDQWZRUNHUV·
employment was neatly and simply summarized.  
 
Seasonal cane cutters in the Pontal of Paranapanema 
     Seasonal migrant work in the cane fields has long been synonymous with subcontracting, 
super exploitation and extremely precarious living and working arrangements (Silva 1999).  Thus 
the geographical origin of the 14 workers who died from heart attacks, pulmonary seizures, 
respiratory failures and cerebral injury in just two São Paulo harvests (2004/2005 and 
2005/2006) was just as noteworthy as was their relatively young age (24-50), for they all came 
from the distant towns of Minas Gerais, Bahia, Maranhão and Piauí (Alves 2006).  Indeed, the 
impact of their deaths was such that the Minister of Work was moved to condemn the pay-per-
production system at the heart of the migrant labour system, which he believed was contributing 
to deaths.7  The wretched experience of such migrant workers, though, is not only measured in 
terms of these 14 deaths.  Thus, half of the 5 244 workers freed from slave-like conditions in 
Brazil in 2008 alone were internal migrant workers working in the sugarcane industry (Repórter 
Brasil 2008).  
     Given this recent history it is not surprising that migrant seasonal work has been downplayed 
by industry representatives.  Enquiries in the Pontal region about its existence typically result in 
producer, municipal authority and even trade union indifference or denial.  Yet, in Martinópolis 
it did not take long walking through the streets to find migrant workers from the states of Minas 
Gerais and Bahia housed LQWKHWRZQ·V hostels.  When we entered one of these facilities in the 
town centre we discovered boxes storing personal items and signs of lunch in an improvised 
NLWFKHQ7HQDGXOWVDQGWKUHHFKLOGUHQXQGHUWKHDJHRIWZRRFFXSLHGWKHKRVWHO·VILYHVLQJOH 
URRPV$V,JQHVH[SODLQHGLW¶LVYHU\FRPPRQLQRXUFLW\>0RQWH]XPD0LQDV*HUDLV@IRU
women to be abandoned by husbands who migrate to work in the sugar plantations in São 
Paulo.  So we prefer to close up our home, pick up the children and follow our hXVEDQGV·)RU
her part, Ana, who is 24 and a mother of two and who travelled 3000km from Bahia, explained 
how the family all sleep in the same bed and how wives try to earn some extra money by cooking 
or cleaning for other migrant workers or by seeking cleaning jobs in town because their 
husbands·HDUQLQJVDUHEDUHO\VXIILFLHQW:KHUHWKHFKLOGUHQDUHschool-aged, the situation is 
more complicated, for the migration period (May to October) disrupts the school calendar and 
school places are difficult to come by. 
     Another worker we interviewed ² Ze ² typically returns to the hostel exhausted after 6.30 pm.  
Also from Montezuma in Minas Gerais, his return home does not mean that his working day has 
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ended.  His clothes are drenched in sweat and black from the soot of the burnt sugarcane, which 
is ignited to strip away the fibres to make it easier to cut, even at the price of increasing nine-fold 
WKHFDUFLQRJHQVLQWKHFXWWHUV·OXQJV+HQFHKHPXVWZDVKDQGGU\KLVFORWKHVDQGVWDUW
preparing his dinner anGVRPHIRRGIRUWKHIROORZLQJGD\¶,W·VQRWZRUWKLW·KHVLJKV¶,W·VWRR
PXFKSDLQIRUWRROLWWOH·KHGHFODUHV, as he sets down his cap. 
     Like many others, Ze was recruited by a representative of the Atena Distillery of 
Martinópolis, the only company that acknowledged hiring migrant labour in the region, despite 
WKHODUJHQXPEHURIZRUNHUVHYLGHQWLQYDULRXVPXQLFLSDOKRVWHOV7KHFRPSDQ\·VDJULFXOWXUDO
manager explained that 30-SHUFHQWRIWKHSODQWDWLRQ·VKDUYHVWLVVWLOOPDQXDODQGORFDOODEour 
is generally unavailable to work all the various plantations.  Furthermore, he stated, one worker 
from Minas Gerais did the work of three locals in a day.  In his view, this greater productivity 
was because migrants were more committed to their work during the season as they needed to 
earn enough resources to sustain for the rest of the year their families, who remained in their city 
of origin.  Hence, a representative is sent annually to carry out the selection of workers and 
return with an official document registering the workers with the Ministry of Work and 
Employment (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego).  However, the meagre amount that Ze earns 
per metre cut, R$0.14, demanded an increase in daily production and so he extended his workday 
from a 3.20pm finish to a 5.30pm one.  For our interviewees, though, their poor wages hardly 
cover their living basics.  Moreover, as the company provides transport back to their homes at 
the end of the season only for the migrant workers, not their families, the expense of the return 
journey is a further stress.  In such a situation, the only option for many, ably abetted by the 
employer, is to breach the poorly policed labour regulations in order to increase productivity.  
Thus, ten-hour working days are commonly undertaken, which means that workers often cut an 
extraordinary 18-20 tonnes per day during the six months of their contract before facing seasonal 
unemployment at the end of October.  
 
Outsourcing of transport 
     Given their bleak prospects, not all of the workers return to their towns of origin at the end 
of the season and they are often joined by others from neighbouring and distant states in seeking 
further employment within the sugar and ethanol production chain.  As mechanization 
eliminates field labour ² and with it the ¶problem· of cutters· notorious work conditions ² and as 
a new, skilled workforce demands secure jobs within the distilleries, global corporations have 
sought to drive cost savings further along the production chain.  Although Brazilian labour 
regulations SURKLELWWKHRXWVRXUFLQJRIDFRPSDQ\·VSULPDU\DFWLYLWLHV, this law is keenly 
192 
 
contested and the outsourcing of the cutting, loading and transporting of sugarcane and its 
various products has proliferated in the industry (Scheidl and Simon 2012).  As a spokesperson 
for Odebrecht Agroindustrial, the only company in the Pontal to outsource all activities beyond 
its distillery operations, stated to us: 
IW·VQRWLQWKHLQWHUHVWVIRUWKHODUJHJURXSVWRWLHUHVRXUFHVWREX\LQJLPSOHPHQWV
[harvesters] or vehicle fleets [cars, buses or trucks] if it is possible to outsource the 
service.  In addition, the service provider takes responsibility for labour issues.  
7KLVRXWVRXUFLQJFUHDWHVQHZRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUORFDO¶HQWUHSUHQHXUV·DQGQHZSUHFDULous working 
arrangements for both local and migrant workers. 
     Widespread outsourcing of transport really began when large landowners, who either 
converted or leased their land to supply sugar to the distilleries, began to contract out the job of 
transporting the prime material.  This paved the way for small, local entrepreneurs and larger 
transport companies to enter the local production chain.  Myriad migrant workers from Minas 
Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná were enticed there, either directly by the small transport 
companies contracted by the landowners or through agents promising work, good wages, food 
and free accommodation to these young men.  However, once there the best that many could do 
was to secure temporary contracts as drivers, a situation of little concern to local authorities.  In 
place of the promises given by the well-spoken contractors, these workers now occupy dirty, 
unventilated and crowded accommodations whilst waiting to secure another exhausting shift in 
WKHUHJLRQ·VFDQHILHOGV7KHJULPKXPDQIDFHRIWKHVH¶ORJLVWLFDOSDUWQHUVKLSV·, with their lean 
organizational processes designed to minimize overheads, reduce the time between harvest and 
processing, cut the cost and risk of labour engagement, and require an exceptional and ultimately 
dangerous daily and seasonal flexibility, can perhaps best be illustrated by the following three 
accounts from outsourced drivers whom we met. 
     One driver ² João, aged 38 ² stated that although his employer officially sets out his daily 
hours and targets on paper, it is the ethanol companies and the sugar suppliers who actually fix 
the number of daily trips and distances to be travelled between collection and delivery of the 
sugarcane and thus how much he must work in any given day.  As the radius of source material 
is expanding to meet the crushing capacity of the new distilleries, and with distances of as much 
as 75km between plantation and distillery, João must leave the house at 5am if he is to complete 
his three trips across the region.  He travels one-and-a-half hours to begin the shift but, in order 
to satisfy his boss and make the deliveries between plantations, he must skip lunch, breaking for 
a quick toilet stop or coffee only when maintenance problems halt his movements or when 
loading or unloading.  He returns to his accommodation 15 hours later.  
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     For their part, workers transporting sugarcane from plantation Paranapanema II to the city of 
Presidente Prudente were on a 12-hour rotation when we met them and, when required, they 
undertook a double shift.  That meant a 24-hour working day, after which they were granted a 
rest time of 27 hours, even though legally a regulated journey time is six hours and a double shift 
of 12 hours should require a 36-hour break.  Nevertheless, with a dearth of employment in the 
area, and in the distant hope of earning enough money to choose his own work by purchasing 
his own truck, Francis made the journeys to ensure the company he worked for would meet the 
almost-impossible targets set by the industry, win further contracts in a viciously competitive 
environment and that he, in turn, would be chosen again as a driver.  
     )LQDOO\LQRUGHUWRIXOILOWKHLUREOLJDWLRQVWRWUDQVSRUWWKHSODQWDWLRQV·UDZPDWHULDODVVZLIWO\
as possible, the contracted trucking companies compliment their fleet at times of peak harvest by 
hiring in a further party, normally a smaller unit with one or two trucks.  This is an additional 
fourth stage of subcontracting.  In such situations the distillery contracts the plantation owner to 
provide sugarcane, the plantation contracts a trucking company to transport the prime material 
as it is harvested, the trucking company subcontracts a smaller company at times of high peak 
harvest, and this employer seeks out and temporarily contracts the ultimate actor in this 
particular network, Mal.  :KLOVW0DODJHGLVORFDOO\ERUQKH¶KDVQRFKRLFH·EXWWRIROORZWKH
ZRUNWRZKHUHYHULWLVFDOOHGLQ¶RWKHUZLVHWKHERVVGRHVQRWKLUHXV·,QRUGHUWRVHFXUHZRUN
throughout the year and to remain in favour with the employer, he travels from job to job across 
the state of São Paulo and often spends two months in the neighbouring state of Mato Grosso 
do Sul.  In doing so he adopts the precarious lifestyle of the other migrant workers from further 
afield, scraping out an existence in these outsourced sections of the sugar and ethanol industry 
DQGVOHHSLQJLQWKHZRUNHUV·GRUPLWRULHVOLWWHUHGDFURVVWKHWZRVWDWHVZLWKRIWHQ¶MXVWDPDWWUHVV
to sleep on, a jar of coffee and an old pot to FRRNULFHDQGVRPHVDXVDJH· 
     Unsurprisingly, as the testimonies of workers in the region make visible, the dangerous 
cocktail of sleepiness, fatigue and high-speed journeys in a struggle to achieve difficult goals 
means that accidents plague the industry.  In 2011 and 2012, five drivers from Pontal of 
Paranapanema municipalities lost their lives in traffic accidents.  Nationally, in 2010 the road 
transport of cargo killed more workers than any other industry.  State figures show that 40 per 
cent of all work-related accidents in the sector in São Paulo State between 1978 and 2008 were in 
transportation.  Today, outsourced workers account for 80 per cent of all work accidents 
involving serious injury or death in Brazil.  Although the state has attempted to better regulate 
the industry, according to a local transport union the outsourced contracts are normally struck 
between the agribusiness and an individual rather than with an organized company with a 
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Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas (CNPJ, a legal registration number issued by the 
Brazilian Ministry of Revenue).  Moreover, they are usually struck in the absence of union 
agreements and this further hinders control and supervision by both organized labour and the 
Ministry of Work and Employment.  The result is that irregularities permeate labour contracts, 
such that almost impossible targets are set, overtime is unpaid, and shifts that are more than 
twice the legal working hours are routinely accepted.  The new wave of temporary contracts and 
seasonal work inherent in the new working patterns adds further complexity to an industry that, 
as we now explore, has been notoriously resistant to regulation.   
 
CHALLENGING SERVITUDE: RESISTANCE, REGULATION AND PRECARIOUS 
WORK 
Trade unions and the cane cutters 
     After finishing work on a Saturday, Pedro sits with two colleagues in Tarumã and recalls 
when 2300 cane cutters in the fields staged a successful strike at NovAmérica in 1986 WKDW¶VKXW
WKHSODFHGRZQIRUZHHNV·7Kis fight for the right to a 44-hour working week, equal pay for 
female cane cutters, eight-hour days and regularly paid, if still very low, wages was followed by 
strike actions by distillery workers in Tarumã and Maracaí in 1989 and came at the close of a 
decade of immense pressure for labour, land and democratic reform in Brazil.  The Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT ² WKH:RUNHUV·3DUW\WKH&HQWUDOÓQLFDGRV7UDEDOKDGRUHV&87² the 
QDWLRQDO8QLWHG:RUNHUV·&RQIHGHUDWLRQWKHMovimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST ² 
Landless WorkerV·Movement) and the Federação dos Empregados Rurais Assalariados do 
Estado de São Paulo (FERAESP ² the São Paulo Federation of Rural State Employees) all 
emerged in this period as movements with the potential to mobilize.  Now, however, more than 
two decades on, the sugarcane cutters bemoan the fact that ¶ZLWKmechanization it [striking] is 
KDUGHU7KH\MXVWVD\WKH\GRQ·WQHHG\RX·6XFKDVHQVHRISRZHUOHVVQHVVLVZLGHVSUHDG+HQFH
IRU7RQLIURP$VVLVUHIOHFWLQJRQPRUHUHFHQWVWULNHVDWWKHSODQW¶,W>VWULNLQJ@ZDVQ·WZRUWKLW
7KH\MXVWVDFNHGHYHU\RQH·  The origins of such feelings can be traced to the 1990s, when 
harvesting and planting machines began replacing workers.  An annual reduction in workers 
(about 10 per cent per year) has created an acutely disempowering sense of insecurity amongst 
the cutters we interviewed.  Their diminishing numbers, together with a fragmentation of the 
labour movement more generally, inversely correlated with the growing power and wealth of the 
industrial oligarchs identified earlier in this chapter. 
     Given that all rural unions in São Paulo State are experiencing falling membership and several 
are struggling just to keep their doors open, the continued indifference of most to the seasonally 
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contracted workers who have in recent years tripled the harvest workforce is perhaps surprising, 
DOWKRXJKLWLVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH%UD]LOLDQODERXUPRYHPHQW·VJHQHUDOUHOXFWDQFHWRHQJDJHZLWKWKH
huge informal sector that still stands at around 20 million workers (almost half of the working 
population) (Zylberstajn 2006).  Complaints by local workers in the Pontal that northern workers 
are taking local jobs or are assigned the more favourable stretches of sugarcane point to divisions 
on the plantations, divisions which have often been exploited by managers when solidarity has 
been shown.  For example, following the 2008 strike to raise monthly basic income from R$470 
to R$550 at the Cocal plant in Paraguaçu, 205 seasonal workers were singled out for dismissal 
and bussed 3000km back to Ceara.   
     The opening of a second plant by Cocal in the Pontal of Paranapanema the year following the 
strike had, in the eyes of one cutter, Marcio, increased  WKHFRPSDQ\·VSRZHUand made it even 
more difficult to achieve further gains:  
We struck before, various times.  Sometimes you would get something, other times 
QRWKLQJ%XWQRZWKH\KDYHEXLOW&RFDO,,VR\RXNQRZ>KHVKDNHVKLVKHDG@WKH\·UH
powerful. 
The geographical flexibility of employers and workers is asymmetrical, a factor which 
characterizes the emergent labour relations regime in the region.  Hence, the current logic of 
accelerated territorial expansion and streamlined organizational capacity across state, regional, 
national and international boundaries that typifies the successful sugar and ethanol corporations 
contrasts starkly with the relatively fixed nature of the rural trade unions, whose geographical and 
occupational limits to organizing are enshrined in Brazilian labour law that dates to the 1940s.  
Elio Neves, the President of FERAESP, the federation for rural employees in the state of São 
Paulo, put it succinctly:  
In Brazil we have trade unions, but we do not have a trade union movement.  Those are 
two different things.  A movement means the collective good, recognizing the struggle of 
other workers.  Here in São Paulo«you have workers from Paraguaçu, Maracaí, Tarumá, 
Florínea, Assis, small towns in the Pontal.  <RX·YHPD\be ten rural trade unions in that 
area representing those workers but you have one company, Raízen, with 24 distilleries, 
or two maybe ² with Cocal ² exploiting all of them! 
     Within a corporate trade union structure modelled on that of 0XVVROLQL·V,WDO\VHH*RPHV
and Prado 2011), a trade union must limit its activities to a defined geographical area and the 
specific occupation of worker that it represents, giving it a monopoly on representation for that 
category of worker in that area.  A universal union fee RQHGD\·VZDJH is paid annually by all 
workers registered in the sector.  This means that a worker can avail themselves of the rights of 
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collective agreements whilst the union receives his or her annual contribution, whether the 
worker is a member of the trade union or not.  The result is that unions are spatially limited and 
that cane cutters, drivers and machine operators in factories refining sugar primarily for food and 
those refining it for ethanol distilleries may all belong to different unions who appear to be more 
content with co-existence than co-operation.  Many of the rural unions prefer their autonomy to 
allying with either of the two federations in São Paulo State: the traditionally more conservative 
Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de São Paulo, linked to the 
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG ² National Confederation 
of Agricultural Workers); and FERAESP, born out of the FXWWHUV·militant actions in the 1980s..   
     For rural trade unionist Joelson in Tarumá¶ZKHQPD\EHRQO\RUSHUFHQWRIZRUNHUV
DUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHXQLRQ· this verticalized structure makes basic organizing difficult, whilst 
horizontal divisions compromised the broader impact of spontaneous strikes by some 10 000 
cane cutters that took place in several isolated locations across the state in 2008 in response to 
suppressed wages (Repórter Brasil 2008).  The illegal dismissal of strike leaders by both small and 
multinational companies during that period of financial crisis and the historical risk in 
confronting powerful agricultural interests may also partially explain the distinct acquiescence of 
many local unions.  For instance, forty cane cutters were injured, three shot and one killed in the 
uprising of 1984 in Guariba.  More recently, the January 2013 assassination of Cicero Guedes, a 
cane cutter and leading member of the landless people·s movement in Rio de Janeiro, brought to 
1650 the number of rural and indigenous workers killed in land-related conflicts since 1985, the 
year in which conflicts began to be systematically recorded E\%UD]LO·V3DVWRUDO/DQG
Commission (CPT).  In 2010, one year after negotiating improved conditions for cutters with 
President Lula da Silva and UNICA, the FERAESP President, Elio Neves, narrowly survived an 
attempt on his life.  6HDWHGLQKLVRIILFHZLWKDPXUDOVWDWLQJWKDW¶ZLWKout agrarian reform there is 
QRGHPRFUDF\·KHSRLQWVWRWKHSDUWLFXODUFKDOOHQJHVWRFRPEDWWLQJSUHFDULRXVZRUNDPRQJst 
cane cutters and rural workers, one quarter of whom may still be unregistered in the industry:  
You have trade union offices with a paid official behind a desk with a pen, telling us that 
everything is ok.  They are open 8-5pm.  :RUVHVWLOO\RXKDYHRIILFHVZKHUH\RX·OOILQG
nobody in them!  But when are rural workers really exploited?  In the evenings, at night, 
at the weekends.  A union movement needs to be there.  ,I\RXGRQ·WKDYHWUDGHXQLRQV
GRLQJWKHLUZRUNWKHQ\RXGRQ·WNQRZFDQ·WNQRZZKDWLVJRLQJRQ Two years ago we 
met the government and asked how many salaried rural workers there were in the 
country.  Nobody could tell us.  $QGWKDW·VWKHIRUPDOO\HPSOR\HGZRUNHUV 
197 
 
     As biofuel companies upscale their operations across state and national boundaries, the 
difficulty in motivating and organizing labour horizontally across occupational divisions has been 
complicated by very evident diverging political trajectories of the federations representing the 
diverse workforce at regional and national levels.  For example, in contrast to Neves, the General 
Secretary of the São Paulo Federation of Workers in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries 
(which represents workers in the ethanol-refining distilleries and laboratories), Edson Bicalho, 
shares the corporate drive to develop ethanol as an international commodity and is a proponent 
of mechanization.  In this regard he has carrieGWKHIHGHUDWLRQ·VYLVLRQRI¶GHFHQWZRUN·WR
international forums in Latin America and Europe.  As he put it: 
You have to understand that relations between capital and labour have changed.  If a 
company cannot modernize, automate, it does not remain competitive.  Yes, there may 
be fewer jobs but these are skilled, better quality jobs.   
The geographical limitations of localized rural unions, the fault lines running through the trade 
union structure and diverging political trajectories at higher scales of labour organization and 
bargaining, then, all mean that principled actions in the interests of vulnerable workers are often 
overshadowed by, at best, a defensive compliance with employers or, at worst, a rather 
comfortable corporate management of unrest within the organizational logic of the industry.    
 
State, corporations and organized labour 
     The increasing international visibility of the sector, however, is providing opportunities for 
workers to better challenge longstanding exploitative practices.  For instance, in the region of 
Middle Paranapanema, tighter social regulations linked to the International Labour Organisation 
that were required for the export market have contributed to the phasing out of the despised, 
subcontracted cane cutting operations.  As one local trade unionist (Sandro) pointed out: 
The unions have been involved in improving conditions for sure.  But, to be 
honest, probably the biggest influence has been from the Ministry of Work [and 
Employment].  Nearby you have Raízen Maracaí, the first company to get the 
Better Sugar stamp for the European market.  If you look I expect many more 
producers are sending their sugarcane to that mill.  But this stamp requires 
regulation and checks of the sector and so the Ministry has played a large role[,] 
WKRXJK\RXSUREDEO\GRQ·WKDYHWRJRWRRIDUWRILQGWKLQJVWKDWDUHZURQJ 
6DQGUR·VILQDOZRUGVSRLQWRIWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHVHFHUWLILFDWLRQVFKHPHVWKDWODUJHO\UHO\upon 
market incentives for labour regulation and stretch the capacity of government ministries  to 
¶SROLFH·WKHVH.  One such scheme has been %UD]LO·V¶1DWLRQDO&RPPLWPHQWIRUWKH,PSURYHPHQW
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RI/DERXU&RQGLWLRQVLQWKH6XJDUFDQH,QGXVWU\·, a voluntary agreement of the type favoured by 
powerful biofuel lobbies across national borders (Franco et al. 2010). and signed in 2009 by the 
federal government, E\WKHUXUDOZRUNHUV·IHGHUDWLRQV)(5$(63 and CONTAG, and by the 
industry association UNICA.  Following audited health checks of their operationsin 2012 
President Dilma Rouseff was moved to personally present 169 companies with certificates in 
what her General Secretary, Gilberto Carvalho, FDOOHGD¶historic moment in relations between 
FDSLWDODQGODERXU·(Secretary General 2012).  Corporate websites across the industry presented 
the certification as further indication of the strides being taken on environmental and social 
responsibility.  
     By late 2012, however, 60 of these companies were being investigated through the courts for 
serious labour violations.  In Goiás State, home to the greatest recent expansion of sugarcane, 39 
workers freed from slave-like conditions had been found working in the mechanized cutting of 
cane.  They had been subjected to 27-hour working periods without a break, whilst two workers 
involved in a serious accident had each been working in excess of 20 hours (Repórter Brasil 
2011b).  In SãR3DXORRIWKHDJUHHPHQW·VVLJQDWRULHVZHUHLQYROYHGLQODERXUFRXUWDFWLRQV
for failing to provide their workers with protective equipment, toilet, eating or rest facilities and 
for continuing to use third-party contractors to hire workers.  Amongst these was Raízen 
Energia S.A., the largest plant in the country, which faced 35 violations and had one conviction 
on appeal relating to inadequate provision of rest for workers, inadequate breaks in journeys 
made by workers and for the outsourcing of their primary activities; workers in the mechanized 
harvesting sector were dismissed on 10 July 2012 and rehired through an agency the following 
day at 63 per cent of their wages (Jornal de Araraquara 2012).  The company is currently being 
investigated for neglect linked to the death of a worker in 2012.  Although wind and not the 
employer was blamed for the burning to death of a young worker at the Cocal plant in 
Paraguaçau in 2012, the latter was fined only months later for subjecting cutters to hazardous 
work conditions in searing heat.  The result of all of this was that by July 2013 the national 
agreement was in tatters, the seals deemed meaningless by the government and courts and a 
representative of CUT complained that the good faith of workers and their unions had simply 
¶EHHQXVHG·WRPDNHPRQH\IURPH[SRUWV1RYDFDQD 
 
CONCLUSION  
     The territorial advances of export-orientated sugar and ethanol corporations are replacing the 
plantations and distilleries of the former land-owning elites.  Their digitized plant operations and 
lean performance management systems, advanced biotechnologies and ¶total quality· organization 
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of work dovetail with historically low wages and super exploitation to restructure society and 
space, whilst renewing land and wealth concentration in Brazil.  Although export-orientated 
strategies have formalized employment relations in specific sites of production, corporate claims 
of sustainable development and ¶VRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\·are countered by the experiences of those 
who cut and transport raw sugar.  Their testimonies point to massive labour exclusion, rather 
than widespread reform, and the intensification of existing manual harvesting to stave off 
unemployment and secure a living wage, whilst new forms of work intensity, insecurity and 
precarity are produced through the outsourcing of transport.  In this context it is appropriate to 
remember that Marx (1976) recognized that capitalism requires the movement between the 
destruction and creation of employment across space and time, that accumulation involves 
dispossession.  In this regard, the gradual disintegration of rural livelihoods and the dissolution 
of exploitative work in some locations and its reproduction in the new frontiers of production 
and elsewhere along the commodity chain suggest that primitive accumulation is not the 
precursor to subsequent advanced forms of production but, instead, part of a continual process 
of dispossession across Brazilian soil (see Harvey 2003).  In their encounter with capitalist 
production, those who cut and transport raw sugarcane articulate all four distinct stages by which 
Marx stated that workers are alienated.  In the first of these the worker loses ownership over the 
means of production.  In the second s/he is removed from controlling the output of her/his 
productivity as a waged labourer.  In the third stage the estrangement is spiritual: tKHZRUNHU·V 
degradation via the work experience means that s/he no longer recognizes her/himself.  The 
result is that cane cutters and drivers internalize exploitation by pushing themselves to shorten 
breaks and lengthen working days so as to make enough each day to cover basic living expenses, 
to bring the family home DIWHUDVHDVRQ·VZRUN, and to retain the favour of the employer, all of 
which FRPSURPLVHVFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQZLWKIHOORZZRUNHUV0DU[·VIRXUWKVWDJHRIDOLHQDWLRQ.   
     For sure, there have been spontaneous actions by cane cutters and some individual unions 
have been willing to confront their local industry whilst their federation, FERAESP, has been 
HQHUJHWLFRQEURDGHUTXHVWLRQVRIUXUDOZRUNHUV·ULJKWV, supporting land occupations and in 
resisting occupational segregation.  However, mass unemployment through factory closures and 
mechanization has compounded problems for a fragmented labour movement that has struggled 
to embrace informal, seasonal and precarious work.  Ironically, then, the most salient displays of 
worker unity across the occupations have been in response to plant closures which have left 
thousands unemployed with little prospect of work.  For those displaced, the result will be a 
future that involves UHOLDQFHXSRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VIDPLO\DVVLVWDQFHSDFNDJHVDFFHVVHGE\
seasonal workers upon their return to their home states. 
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     The global corporations·FRQILGHQWPDUNHWLQJ, though, belies a structural instability as 
subsidized oil prices and a suppressed international market for ethanol causes further problems 
for even leading brands.  As logistics and science overcome spatial barriers and poor soils, 
territorial expansion may postpone financial crises for these enterprises that carry high debt 
burdens.  Growth into the central savannas and pastures, however, requires ever more foreign 
capital at a time when large quantities have been returning to North America and Europe.8  With 
predictions that a further 60 distilleries will close in the near future, that full mechanization of 
cane cutting and planting in São Paulo State will be in place by 2017, and that migrant workers 
seeking futures in these new frontiers will be even worse off as a result, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for the corporate promoters of ¶green· energy to render invisible the distinct 
social challenges that their monopolistic advances bring.  It would also appear that a revival of 
the spirit that wrought such important changes to Brazil in the 1980s is needed if workers and 
their movements are to overcome divisions between the formally and informally employed, 
between occupations and between different regions so as to be able to rise to these challenges in 
WKHQHZVSDFHVRI%UD]LO·VELRIXHOSURGXFWLRQ  
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1
 Clearly, this phrase plays off the concept of the ¶VXUYLYDORIWKHILWWHVW·$OWKRXJKXVXDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK'DUZLQ
the SKUDVHZDVDFWXDOO\FRLQHGE\+HUEHUW6SHQFHU'DUZLQKDGLQLWLDOO\XVHGWKHWHUP¶QDWXUDOVHOHFWLRQ·EHIRUH
DGRSWLQJ6SHQFHU·VWHUPLQRORJ\ 
2 When adjusted for inflation, the minimum wage fell by 60 per cent between 1959 and 1975 and 52 per cent of 
workers earned less than that (Fausto 1999).  Inequality rose from a Gini index of 0.5 to 0.6 (amongst the highest in 
the world) between 1960 and 1979, reaching 0.64 in 1989. 
3
 By 1999, 1 per cent of the population owned 53 per cent of GNP.  Only one-third of Brazilians had a registered 
job in 2002. 
4
 US$1 = approximately R$2.5 
5 By way of comparison, the entire PROALCOOL programme had cost only R$7 billion.  
6
 The current basic wage for cane cutters in Maracaí of R$900 contrasts with the R$2900 that the labour agency 
DIEESE estimates is the necessary living wage for Brazil (DIEESE, 2014). 
7 As the death of a locally born 53-\HDUROGDWWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHG$OYRUDGRG·2HVWHSODQWLQ3RQWDOLn 2008 
showed, the cane field mortalities have not been restricted to migrants. 
8 Consultants predict that a further foreign investment of R$44 billion is required for its predicted expansion of 3.1 
million hectares in sugarcane (Estado do S. Paulo 2011) 
